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Abstract
Recent developments in Canada, the United Kingdom, the euro
area, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States have triggered
a debate on whether monetary policy is e¤ective when the nominal
interest rate is close to zero. In this context, the monetary authority
is no longer in a position to pursue a policy of monetary easing by
lowering nominal interest rates further. However, some economists
have down-played the risk of hitting the zero lower bound, at least for
the US economy.
In this paper, I assess the implications of the zero lower bound
in a DSGE model with nancial frictions. The nancial accelerator
mechanism is formalized as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1995).
The paper attempts to address three main issues.
First, I evaluate whether the zero lower bound by limiting the use
of the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument might hamper the
monetary authority from o¤setting the negative e¤ects of an adverse
shock.
Second, I analyze whether price-level targeting, through the sta-
bilization of private sector expectations, might be a better monetary
rule than ination targeting in order to avoid the "liquidity trap".
I am grateful to Raf Wouters for his excellent supervision. I thank my discussant
Ragna Alstadheim and the participants in the 6th Dynare Conference at Bank of Finland
in June 2010. Part of this work was done while the author was visiting the National Bank
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Third, I investigate the e¤ectiveness of scal stimulus (namely, an
increase in government expenditure) when nancial markets are im-
perfect and the nominal interest rate is close to its zero lower bound.
In this context, two questions will be addressed: rst, do nancial fric-
tions weaken the e¤ect of a scal expansion? Second, how are results
a¤ected when the zero lower bound is binding?
To address these questions, I introduce a negative demand shock
and an adverse nancial shock. I nd that by adopting a price-level
targeting rule, the monetary authority might alleviate the recession
generated by the interaction of nancial frictions and lower-bounded
nominal interest rates. Alternatively, an increase in government ex-
penditure has a positive impact on output, but scal multipliers are
below one, due to a strong crowding-out e¤ect of private consump-
tion. This e¤ect is muted when the nominal interest rate is lower
bounded. In analyzing discretionary scal policy, this paper does also
focus on two crucial aspects: the duration of the scal stimulus and
the presence of implementation lags.
JEL classication: E31, E44, E52, E58.
Keywords: Optimal monetary policy, nancial accelerator, lower
bound on nominal interest rates, price-level targeting, scal stimulus.
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1 Introduction
For several decades, many central banks around the world have enacted dis-
inationary policies and have successfully brought ination down. As a con-
sequence, in recent years interest rates were low, which brought the potential
threat of deation and a binding zero bound on nominal interest rate into
focus. In this context, the monetary authority is no longer in a position
to pursue a policy of monetary easing by lowering nominal interest rates
further.1 By the second quarter of 2009, policy interest rates had fallen be-
low one per cent in Canada, the United Kingdom, the euro area, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United States. The Japanese example o¤ers the most
compelling case: since the late 1990s, Japan has experienced deation and a
short rate very close to zero leaving monetary policy almost helpless to boost
economic activity. These developments have triggered a debate on whether
monetary policy is impotent at the zero bound.
However, some economists have down-played the risk of a binding zero
lower bound, at least for the US and the euro area (Viñals (2001); Co-
enen, Orphanides &Wieland (2003); Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007)). This
strand of literature does not take into account the role played by nancial
1Under these circumstances, monetary policy may still be e¤ective via other transmis-
sion channels than nominal interest rates. Therefore, a binding zero lower bound is a
necessary but not a su¢ cient condition for the liquidity trap to prevail. I follow Buiter &
Panigirtzoglou (2000) in their denition of a liquidity trap. An economy is said to be in a
liquidity trap if all channels of monetary transmission are blocked. Only in one case, the
liquidity trap and the zero bound on nominal interest rates are identical concepts. This
applies if the nominal interest is the only monetary transmission channel.
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frictions.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the extent to which a lower bound
on nominal interest rates might deepen the recession, in the presence of fric-
tions in nancial markets. The structure of the model is a closed economy
DSGE model which contains standard features, such as investment adjust-
ment costs and sticky prices. In addition, I add nancial frictions that are
formalized as in Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1995) and Bernanke and
Gertler (1989, 1998). The source of the nancial accelerator is the asymmet-
ric information that will make it costly for lenders to evaluate the quality of
rmsinvestments. Therefore, lenders require a premium for external funds
over the real opportunity costs equivalent to the riskless interest rate. In
the short run, the presence of a nancial risk premium distorts the dynamic
allocation of capital and investment and leads to an ine¢ ciently low level of
capital, and hence output. The underlying mechanism works in the follow-
ing way. An adverse shock lowers current cash ows, reducing the ability
of rms to self-nance investment projects. This decline in net worth raises
the external nance premium and the cost of new investments. Declining
investment lowers economic activity and cash ow in subsequent periods,
amplifying and propagating the e¤ect of the initial shock. The presence of a
binding zero lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates might further
deepen the recessionary spiral triggered by the nancial accelerator mech-
anism. In the face of an adverse shock that pushes the premia upward, it
could be appropriate to lower the nominal interest rate in order to mitigate
at least partially the recession. This may not be possible if the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates starts to bind.
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The paper attempts to address three main issues. First, I evaluate whether
the zero lower bound might strengthen the e¤ects of a negative shock by
hampering the monetary authority from o¤setting the negative e¤ects of an
adverse shock. Second, I investigate how monetary policy should be set in
order to make the zero lower bound less binding. I analyze whether the price
level is a better target than ination in order to avoid the "liquidity trap"
that might be generated by a binding zero lower bound. The motivation is
the following: when agents are forward-looking and the monetary authority
credibly commits to a price-level targeting rule, private sector expectations
work as automatic stabilizers. Therefore, the initial disination and hence
the variability of interest rates is dampened. Third, I investigate whether
scal policy can alleviate the e¤ects of a binding zero lower bound constraint.
For this purpose, I assess the e¤ectiveness of scal policies when nancial
markets are imperfect and interest rates are very close to the lower bound.
It is a relevant issue to explore because, with the prospect of a severe global
recession that started in 2008-2009, many governments put forward scal
stimulus plans in order to underpin a recovery.2 However, many economies,
such as the US are experiencing low interest rates that fuel the risk of falling
into a liquidity trap. In this context, two questions arise: rst, do nancial
frictions weaken or raise the e¤ect of a scal expansion? Second, are results
a¤ected when the zero lower bound is binding?
2To list some examples: the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in the United
States; the Konjunkturpakete I und II in Germany; the Plan de reliancein France;
the Pacchetto scalein Italy; the El Plan E.in Spain; the pre-Budget Report in the
United Kingdom.
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To address these issues, I introduce two types of shocks: a negative de-
mand shock and a nancial shock. Intuitively, these types of shocks, putting
downward pressure on both output and ination, can cause the economy to
hit the zero lower bound. Output will fall, resulting in lower ination in the
same period. Both e¤ects lead to a lower nominal interest rate.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I present an overview of
the literature. I develop the model in section 3. In section 4, I investigate
whether the lower bound enhances the negative e¤ects of adverse shocks. In
section 5 and section 6, I discuss the role played by monetary and scal policy
when the zero lower bound is binding. More precisely, in section 5, in order
to evaluate the role of monetary policy, I assess whether the price level is a
better target than ination in order to avoid a "liquidity trap" generated by a
binding zero lower bound. In section 6, I introduce an exogenous government
spending shock to assess the role of scal policy. I provide an assessment of
the use of a scal stimulus to underpin a recovery from a severe recession when
the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy weakens after hitting the zero interest-
rate bound. For this purpose, I investigate rst how scal multipliers are
a¤ected by the presence of nancial frictions. Then, I also assess whether
scal multipliers are larger when the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rate is binding. Section 7 provides concluding remarks and outlines further
extensions that can be addressed in future work.
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2 Review of the literature
Recently, several papers have analyzed the implication of the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates on the conduct of optimal monetary pol-
icy. In this section I rst review part of the theoretical literature on the zero
lower bound; then I provide an overview of empirical or historical evaluations
of issues related to the zero lower bound.
From a theoretical point of view, four main strands of the literature fo-
cusing on the zero lower bound can be distinguished.3
The rst one has been pioneered by Krugman (1998) who has emphasized
the importance of lifting expected ination in order to reduce the real interest
rate. In this view, two solutions have been proposed.
The rst way to lift ination expectations is to set a history-dependent
rule, such as a price-level target rule4 or a super-inertial rule, that would
be able to control expectations and hence would deliver a lower variability
in the nominal interest rate and ination. Similarly, Svensson (2000) and
Smets (2000) argue that price-level targeting might be a better way to anchor
expectations than an ination target. Reifschneider and Williams (2000)
show that simple policy rules formulated in terms of a price-level target can
signicantly reduce real distortions associated with the zero lower bound on
3For a more detailed review of policies that are able to reduce the risk of hitting the
zero lower bound, see Yates (2002). For an assessment of the potential e¤ectiveness of
non-standard monetary policy at the zero lower bound, see Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack
(2004).
4Duguay (1994) and Coulombe (1998) also document that a price level target path
implies that expectations help resisting deation and profund downturns if the economy
falls into a zero lower bound situation.
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interest rates. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) consider a simple stochastic
setup in which the economy never falls into a liquidity trap. They show
that a credible commitment to the right sort of history-dependent policy
can largely mitigate the distortions created by the zero bound. In their
model, optimal policy involves a commitment to adjust interest rates so as
to achieve a time-varying price-level target, when this is consistent with the
zero bound. They characterize the optimal policy in such a setting and they
show that it indeed involves a commitment to a history-dependent policy. In
particular, a price-level target commits the central bank to undo any deation
by subsequent ination; a larger disturbance, that creates a larger initial
deation, automatically creates greater ination expectations in response.
Thus, there is an automatic stabilizerbuilt into the price-level target, that
is lacking under a strict ination targeting regime.
Nevertheless, the benets of history-dependent rules depends on the as-
sumption that expectations are forward-looking. For example, the less forward-
looking are expectations, the weaker will be the e¤ect on future expected
nominal rates and expected ination of committing to a price level target.
In addition, Covas and Zhang (2010) show that, with imperfections in both
debt and equity markets, the gain of the price-level targeting regime over the
ination targeting regime depends on the degree of nancial market frictions.
A second way to lift ination expectations is to choose a positive ina-
tion target (around 2%).5 Nevertheless, this approach has been criticized
5Stochastic simulations with macroeconometric models suggest that, at an average
ination rate of 2%, the fraction of time spent at the zero lower bound is likely to be
around 2%. And even for an average ination rate of 1%, the corresponding gure is only
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by Svensson (2000) who argues that the mere announcement of a positive
ination target is not likely to be enough to raise ination expectations. Co-
enen, Orphanides & Wieland (2003) also criticize this argument, asserting
that it might also be di¢ cult to raise ination expectations because price
stickiness can make the expected future price also sticky. Williams (2009)
argues that, if monetary policy follows the standard Taylor rule, an ination
target of 2 % may be insu¢ cient to keep the zero lower bound from imposing
sizable costs in terms of macroeconomic stabilization in a much more adverse
macroeconomic climate.
To conclude, according to this rst strand of literature, the key to e¤ective
central-bank action to escape a "liquidity trap" and to combat a deationary
slump is the management of expectations.
The second strand of literature builds fromBuiter & Panigirtzoglou (2000)
and Goodfriend (2000) who suggested the introduction of so-called Gesell
money. This would imply decreasing the zero nominal interest oor by tax-
ing money holdings. Recall that the zero bound on short-term interest rates
comes about because investors can always hold cash, which pays a guaran-
teed zero return. Any mechanism that seeks to lower the return on cash
below zero would therefore lower the zero oor to interest rates.
A third theoretical approach has been proposed by Svensson (2001). He
suggests a "foolproof " way to escape from the binding zero lower bound
in an open economy framework. The idea is to jump-start the economy
by a real depreciation of the currency via unlimited interventions and in so
doing increase inationary expectations. Initially, an exchange rate peg is
up to around 5%. For further details, see the studies surveyed in Yates (2003).
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established, which is later replaced by a price-level or ination target when
the price-level target has been reached. In so doing the risk of overheating is
avoided.
Finally, Christiano (2004) suggests a fourth approach. He extends the
analysis of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and shows that, when capital
and government spending are introduced into the analysis, the zero bound
is not likely to bind, and if it does the consequences may not be severe.
Moreover, the multiplier on government spending is predicted to be very
large in the event of a binding zero bound, so that an increase in government
spending should help to turn the economy around when monetary policy is
not working. Similar conclusions are reached by Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Rebelo (2009) and Erceg and Linde (2009). They argue that the spending
multiplier can be much larger than in normal situations, and scal stimulus
can be implemented rapidly. Moreover, the budgetary costs may be small as
the large response of output boosts tax revenues, allowing for a scal free
lunch.
Concerning the empirical evaluation of issues related to the zero lower
bound, the literature is abundant. Some authors have down-played the risk
of hitting the zero lower bound, at least for the euro area and the US. Ac-
cording to Coenen, Orphanides &Wieland (2003), the risk of hitting the zero
bound would be negligible for the US with an average nominal interest rate
over the cycle of 3%. To obtain this result, they use stochastic simulations
of a small structural rational expectations model. They assume stochastic
shocks similar in magnitude to those over the 1980s and 1990s. Only with a
lower level of the average nominal interest rate, they found a signicant risk
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of a binding zero bound. Using a similar model, Viñals (2001) compared the
US and the euro area probability of hitting the zero lower bound. His nd-
ings for the US are close to those of Coenen, Orphanides & Wieland (2003).
For the euro area, his results suggest an even smaller probability than for
the US, due to the structural characteristics of the euro area. However, the
probability of a binding zero lower bound depends on the likelihood of a com-
bination of extreme shocks. Since the frequency of such shocks is limited,
they are hard to assess econometrically. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007)
analyze the zero bound problem in a medium-scale DSGE model (calibrated
on US data) with distortionary taxes and three shocks: aggregate productiv-
ity, investment-specic productivity and government spending shocks. They
conclude that the probability of the nominal interest rate approaching the
zero bound is negligible. On the opposite side, Williams (2009) found that
an additional 4 percentage point rate cut would have limited the rise in the
U.S. unemployment rate and would bring unemployment and ination more
quickly to steady-state values, but the zero lower bound precludes such a
sharp rate cut. Christiano (2004) argues that additional research allowing
for a broader range of shocks may improve our understanding of the factors
that occasionally force central banks to face the zero bound on nominal in-
terest rates. Based on this argument, Amano and Shukayev (2009) consider
a broader range of economic shocks. Their results indicate that even under
a zero ination policy, historically-measured aggregate shocks - such as pro-
ductivity, investment-specic productivity, government spending and money
demand shocks - do not drive the nominal interest rate to the zero bound.
The only shock in their analysis that forces the central bank to face the zero
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bound is a risk premium shock.
Moving to an open economy context, Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri
(2009) analyze the transmission of foreign demand shocks to the US economy
using a two-country DSGE model. They nd that when interest rates are
bounded, the impact of an adverse foreign demand shock on the United
States is greatly amplied. If the shock occurs against the backdrop of a
liquidity trap in the US, the output contraction is mainly attributable to
rising real interest rates, as short-term nominal rates cannot decline further
while expected ination falls. As a result, the contraction in net exports
is reinforced by a sharp contraction in private domestic demand. On the
contrary, in the "normal" situation in which policy rates can adjust, lower
real interest rates would cause private domestic demand to expand, and hence
cushion the impact on US output.
Indeed, as Yates (2002) points out, conclusions about the risks of hitting
the zero bound, are going to depend on many factors, such as assumptions
about the variance of shocks, about the rule the central bank follows in
setting monetary policy and about the representation of the economy, which
propagates the shocks into distributions for desired interest rates.
3 Model presentation
The model used is a closed economy DSGE model similar to Christensen
and Dib (2006). The model contains standard features, such as adjustment
cost on investment and sticky prices. In addition, I add nancial frictions as
in Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1995) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989,
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1998). The source of the nancial accelerator is the asymmetric information
that will make it costly for lenders to evaluate the quality of rms invest-
ments.
There are ve sectors in the economy: households, entrepreneurs, capi-
tal producers, retailers and nal goods producers. In addition, there is the
monetary authority that sets the nominal interest rate, according to a stan-
dard Taylor rule. Households nance entrepreneurspurchase of capital by
lending deposits. The presence of asymmetric information between entre-
preneurs and lenders creates nancial frictions which make entrepreneurial
demand for capital depend on their nancial position. Capital producers
build unnished capital and sell it to entrepreneurs. Competitive nal good
rms combine the nal capital good produced by entrepreneurs and labour
supplied by households. They combine these two factors to produce a ho-
mogeneous nal good. Retailers are the source of nominal frictions. They
di¤erentiate the homogeneous nal good and sell it in monopolistically com-
petitive retail markets. They set nominal prices in a staggered fashion à la
Calvo (1983).
3.1 Households
Preferences of a household j 2 [0; 1] at time t are described by:
maxU
(j)
t = E0
1X
t=0
tu(C
(j)
t ; H
(j)
t )
where  is the discount factor, Ct is a composite consumption index and
Ht is labor supply.
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Let the functional form of u be given by:
u(C
(j)
t ; H
(j)
t ) =
1
1   (C
(j)
t )
1    H
(j)1+ 
t
1 +  
A consumers revenue ow comes from her supply of hours of work to
rms for wages Wt, prots t from rms and the return on assets Bt .
PtCt = W
(j)
t H
(j)
t +t + (Rt + Zt)Bt  Bt 1
The rst order conditions (hereafter, f.o.c.) from the maximization prob-
lem are:
Et[(Rt + Zt)(Ct+1)
 ] = (Ct) 
Wt =

 ULt
UCt

= H (Ct)

The disturbance term Zt drives a wedge between the interest rate con-
trolled by the central bank and the return on assets held by households.
Zt follows the rst-order autoregressive process:
Zt = ZZt 1 + "Zt
where Z 2 (0; 1) is an autoregressive coe¢ cient and "Zt is normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation Z .
A positive risk premium shock increases the return on assets held by
households and hence increases savings and reduces current consumption.
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At the same time, this shock also increases the cost of capital and reduces
investment. The risk premium shock helps to explain the comovement of
consumption and investment.6
Finally, for the Fisher condition, the real interest rate is dened as follows:
Rt = R
n
t
Pt+1
Pt
3.2 Production sectors
3.2.1 Capital producers
Production of unnished capital goods is carried out by competitive rms.
Newly produced capital goods replace depreciated capital and add to the
capital stock. I assume that capital producers are subject to quadratic capital
adjustment costs, so that the marginal return to investment in terms of
capital goods is declining in the amount of investment undertaken, relative
to the current capital stock.
Capital producers make their production plans one period in advance.
They maximize
maxEt 1
("
QtIt   It   
2

It
Kt
  
2#
Kt
)
The f.o.c. gives the standard Tobins Q equation:
Qt = 1 + 

It
Kt
  

6This e¤ect makes this shock di¤erent from a discount factor shock as in Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009).
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Furthermore, the capital stock evolves according to:
Kt = It + (1  )Kt 1
In addition, total output is also determined by exogenous government
spending Gt. I assume that exogenous spending follows a rst-order autore-
gressive process:
Gt = GGt 1 + "Gt
where G 2 (0; 1) is an autoregressive coe¢ cient and "Gt is normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation G .
Final output is the sum of consumption, investment goods and govern-
ment spending
Yt = Ct + It +Gt
3.2.2 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneursbehaviour is modelled along the line of Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (hereafter, BGG), where the source of nancial frictions is the
existence of an agency problem that makes external nance more expensive
than internal funds. The entrepreneurs observe their output which is subject
to a random outcome costlessly. Lenders incur an auditing cost to observe an
entrepreneurs output. After observing her project outcome, an entrepreneur
decides whether to repay her debt or to default. If she defaults, the nancial
intermediary audits the loan and recovers the project outcome less monitoring
costs. Accordingly, the marginal external nancing cost is equal to a gross
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premium for external funds plus the gross real opportunity costs equivalent
to the riskless interest rate.
BGG show that the optimal contract implies that the external nance
premium, s(), depends on the entrepreneurs balance sheet position. In
particular the external nance premium increases with the leverage ratio
and can thus be characterized by the following functional form:
st = s

KtQt
Nt
Xt

where s0() > 0 and s(1) = 1:
The entrepreneursdemand for capital depends on the marginal produc-
tivity of capital and on the capital gain:
Et(Ft+1 + Zt) = Et

rKt+1 + (1  )Qt+1
Qt

where Ft+1 is the external funds rate and and rKt+1 is the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital, at t + 1: The risk premium disturbance a¤ects the cost
of capital.
Thus, the demand for capital should satisfy the following optimality con-
dition that states that the expected real return on capital is equal to the
external nancing cost:
Ft+1 = Rtst
To determine the external nance premium, I adopt the following func-
tional form:
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st =

KtQt
Nt
Xt
!
where ! > 0: Therefore, at time t; the gross external nancial premium
KtQt
Nt
Xt
!
depends on borrowersleverage ratio

KtQt
Nt

, the elasticity of
the external nance premium with respect to the leverage ratio (!) and the
disturbance term Xt.7 The shock Xt follows the rst-order autoregressive
process:
Xt = XXt 1 + "Xt
where X 2 (0; 1) is an autoregressive coe¢ cient and "Xt is normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviation X .
To ensure that entrepreneursnet worth (the rms equity) will never be
enough to fully nance the new capital acquisition, following BGG, I assume
that entrepreneurs have nite lives. The probability that an entrepreneur will
survive until the next period is , so the expected lifetime horizon is
1
1   .
The entrepreneurs aggregate net worth is the equity held by entrepreneurs
surviving from the previous period, and it is dened as follows:
Nt+1 = 

FtQtKt  Rt

KtQt
Nt
Xt
!
(KtQt  Nt)

+ (1  )gt
Here, (1   ) is the share of new entrepreneurs entering the economy
and gt is the transfer or seed money that newly entering entrepreneurs
7In a model without nancial frictions, the leverage ratio is equal to 1 and the elasticity
! = 0.
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receive from entrepreneurs that depart. Since the costs of pure debt nance
are innite, I include the transfer gt to ensure that new entrepreneurs can
operate. I take gt as given; in this quantitative exercise it is of negligible size.
A fall in the price of capital a¤ects the leverage ratio.8 As the leverage
ratio rises, the risk premium also rises. On the one hand, the higher risk
premium will increase the cost of borrowing. On the other hand, the lower
price of capital will decrease the return on capital. Therefore, the entrepre-
neurial net worth will decrease at the end of the period and ceteris paribus,
the leverage ratio will be higher, amplifying the recession.
3.2.3 Final goods producers
Production is carried out by rms that follow a constant-returns-to-scale
technology. To produce output Yt, rms combine nal capital goods and
labour. The technology is dened as follows:
Yt = AK

t H
1 
t
where A is the productivity parameter.
Firms minimize production costs, so the rst order conditions are:
Wt =MCt(1  ) Yt
Ht
rKt =MCt
Yt
Kt
where MCt denotes the marginal production cost for a rms.
8Fluctuations in the price of capital Qt create a link between asset price movements
and the credit cycle (e.g. Kyotaki and Moore (1997) and Christiano, Gust and Roldos
(2002)).
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3.2.4 Retailers
Retailers purchase the wholesale goods at a price equal to nominal marginal
costs and di¤erentiate them at no cost. They then sell these di¤erentiated
retail goods on a monopolistically competitive market.
I introduce a monopolistic competition framework à la Dixit and Stiglitz:
Pt+l = (
1Z
0
p1 #jt+ldj)
1=1 #
Yt+l = (
1Z
0
Y
# 1=#
jt+l dj)
#=# 1
where # is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods.
The aggregate price is
P 1 #t = (1  ')(P t )1 # + 'P 1 #t 1
Following Calvo, I am assuming that rms cannot change their selling
prices unless they receive a random signal. The constant probability to re-
ceive such a signal is (1  '). Each rm j sets the price pt (j) that maximizes
the expected prot for l periods, where l =
1
1  ' is the average length of
time that a price remains unchanged.
The maximization problem is
MaxE0
1X
t=0

(')lt+l(p

t (j) mct+l)
Yt+l(j)
Pt+l

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s:t: Yt+l(j) = (
pt (j)
Pt+l
) #Yt+l
The rst order condition is:
pt (j) =
#
#  1
E0
P1
t=0[(')
lt+lmct+l)
Yt+l(j)
Pt+l
]
E0
P1
t=0[(')
lt+l
Yt+l(j)
Pt+l
]
These equations lead to the following New Keynesian Phillips curve:
t =
(1  ')(1  ')
'
mc^t + Ett+1
where t =
Pt
Pt 1
is the ination rate and mc^t is the log deviation of real
marginal cost from its steady state level.
3.3 Monetary policy
I introduce the zero lower bound (hereafter, ZLB) on the nominal interest
rate, dening the Taylor rule in the following way:
Rnt = dummy
MP Rn + (1  dummyMP )
ht


(Rn)1 RN
 
Rnt 1
RNi
When the nominal interest rate falls below the zero lower bound ( Rn),
the variable dummyMP becomes active and assumes value 1. Otherwise, it
is set equal to 0:
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The parameter  governs the degree to which the ination rate is tar-
geted around the desired target  . Moreover, I am assuming that the mon-
etary authority does not react immediately and adjust interest rate with a
degree of inertia measured by RN .
One caveat is that imposing the ZLB through the introduction of a
dummy variable implies that agents are not able to rationally anticipate
the possibility of hitting the ZLB. Therefore they will not immediately re-
duce their output and ination expectations correspondingly. Therefore, the
policy response is less aggressive than in a model in which agents were able
to anticipate the possibility of hitting the ZLB.9
3.4 Calibration
Following the literature, I set the steady-state rate of depreciation of capital
() equal to 0.025 which corresponds to an annual rate of depreciation equal
to 10 %; the discount factor  is equal to 0.99, which corresponds to an
annual real rate in steady-state of 4 %.
Also other parameters are quite standard. The relative risk aversion
coe¢ cient () is set equal to 1.2. The steady-state share of capital in the
nal goods production function () is equal to 0.5. The probability  that
entrepreneurs will survive for the next period is set equal to 0.9728, therefore
on average entrepreneurs stay in business for 36 years. The elasticity of labor
supply ( ), and the coe¢ cient of labor in utility () are both set equal to
1. The steady-state value of the elasticity of substitution between varieties
9For a further discussion of the role of expectations in models with a zero lower bound
on interest rates, see Adam ad Billi (2006).
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of goods is equal to 6, which implies a mark-up of 20%. The Calvo price
parameter is set equal to 0.75.
The parameters of the monetary policy rule are based on the estimates of
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) for the post-82 period. The coe¢ cient on
ination  is set equal to 1.5, while the interest rate smoothing parameter
RN is equal to 0.8.
There is no consensus on the parameter  describing investment adjust-
ment costs. I set this parameter equal to 1.42.
Finally, the elasticity of risk premia to the leverage ratio (!) is assumed
to be equal to 0.05 and the steady-state value of the leverage ratio equal to
2. The value I choose for the leverage ratio is consistent with a strand of
literature that sets this parameter at a value of 2 for the US.10
4 The e¤ects of the ZLB constraint
In this section, I assess the implications of the ZLB constraint on the nominal
interest rate in a model that entails nancial frictions. For this purpose, I
introduce two kinds of shocks: a negative demand shock (e.g. a risk premium
shock) and an adverse nancial shock (e.g. an increase in the nancial risk
premium). Both shocks are modelled as an AR(1) process with a fairly high
degree of persistence (the autoregressive coe¢ cient is set equal to 0:9). These
two types of shocks are suitable for analyzing the dynamics when the ZLB
is binding, as they put downward pressure on both output and ination,
10To be precise, BGG dene the leverage ratio at time t as
Nt
Qt 1Kt
and so they choose
a steady-state value equal to 0.5.
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which can cause a binding ZLB. Therefore, this potentially creates a more
severe downturn. I contrast the e¤ects under normal situations (i.e. when
the central bank has the ability to lower interest rates in response to the
demand shock) with a situation when the nominal short-term interest rate is
subject to the lower bound. Then, I analyze whether the economy is likely
to be pushed into a more severe recession when the ZLB binds.
4.1 Risk premium shock
In Figure 1, I compare the responses to a risk premium shock under two
alternative specications of the model: the baseline model (namely, the model
without the ZLB constraint, as described in section 4) and a model which
features a binding lower bound on the nominal interest rate. In this latter
specication, the real interest rate is limited in its possibility to stimulate the
economy, after the initial drop in consumption and output. A risk premium
shock reduces both private consumption and investment. On the one hand,
this shock stimulates private savings by increasing the required return on
assets held by households. On the other hand, the price of capital drops as it
depends positively on its expected value and the expected rental capital rate
and negatively on the ex-ante real risk-free interest rate and the risk premium
disturbance. The collapse of the capital price translates into lower investment
and capital. The drop of both consumption and investment results in lower
output and lower ination. The presence of the ZLB makes the drop in
investment more severe, as the risk premium shock produces a deterioration
of the leverage ratio, an increase of the nancial risk premium and a reduction
of entrepreneurial net worth. This mechanism is amplied when the ZLB
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constraint is binding and hence the increase in the nancial risk premium
is stronger. As a consequence, the cost of new investment raises and the
recession is amplied.
4.2 Financial shock
Figure 2 displays the response of the main macro variables to a nancial shock
that pushes up the nancial risk premium, worsening entrepreneursbalance
sheets. As enterprises are limited in their ability to self-nance, the level of
investment falls and the economy is pushed onto a recessionary-deationary
path. The recession is amplied if the lower bound on the nominal interest
rate is binding, as the monetary authority is no longer able to o¤set the
negative e¤ects of an adverse shock by using the nominal interest rate as an
instrument.
5 Is price-level targeting a solution to avoid
the ZLB?
In this section, I explore the issue of whether the price level (hereafter, PLT)
is a better target for monetary policy in order to limit the probability to hit
the ZLB. The motivation is that when expectations are forward-looking
a PLT rule introduces a desirable inertia that a¤ects the private sectors
expectations; hence it results in less volatile interest rates.
The mechanism operates as follows. Assume that a deationary distur-
bance leads to a fall in the price level relative to the target (e.g. a negative
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demand shock). Economic agents observing the shock understand that the
central bank will correct the deviation from the target aiming at an above-
average ination rate. As a result, ination expectations increase, which
helps to mitigate the initial impact of the deationary shock. Under a cred-
ible price level target, ination expectations operate as automatic stabiliz-
ers.11
The main di¤erence between ination-targeting (hereafter, IT) and PLT
is that, under IT, unexpected disturbances to the price-level are ignored,
while under PLT they are reversed. This implies that, under PLT, the price
level has a predetermined targeted path and uncertainty about the future
price level is bounded.
If the monetary authority is concerned about price level stability, the
Taylor rule introduced in paragraph 3.3. is modied as follows:
Rnt = dummy
MP Rn+(1 dummyMP )

Pt= Pt
(Pt 1= Pt 1)P

P
(Rn)1 RN
 
Rnt 1
RN
where Pt is the target or steady-state value for the price level at period t.
Note that for P = 1, the rule is the Taylor rule dened for ination targeting,
while P = 0 signies pure price-level targeting. For 0 < P < 1 the rule
is a hybrid one in which the central bank is concerned about reaching the
ination target rate but also about the evolution of prices on the way to the
ination target. As for the IT regime, when the nominal interest rate falls
below the zero lower bound ( Rn), the variable dummyMP becomes active
and assumes value 1. Otherwise, it is set equal to 0:
11The benecial impact of a PLT rule on ination expectations was lacking in the rst
strand of theoretical analysis based on backward-looking models, as in Lebow, Roberts,
and Stockton (1992), Haldane and Salmon (1995) and Fillion and Tetlow (1994).
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Figure 3 and 4 show the response of the nominal interest rate and other
key variables, to the risk premium shock and to the nancial shock. The
probability of hitting the ZLB is lower if the monetary authority decides to
target the price level instead of the ination rate. When agents are forward-
looking and the monetary authority credibly commits to a PLT rule, such
a rule yields a lower variability of ination and of nominal interest rates.
Agents expect that the monetary authority will correct the deviation from the
target aiming at an above-average ination rate. Private sector expectations
of future ination after a deationary shock dampen the initial disination
and hence stabilize interest rates.12 Therefore, a PLT rule will lower the
probability to hit the ZLB for the nominal interest rate.
6 The e¤ectiveness of scal stimulus in times
of crisis
The recent worldwide economic crisis has renewed attention on the role of
scal policy during both the economic downturn and the "exit" strategy
phase. With the prospect of a severe global recession in 2008-2009, many
governments have put forward scal stimulus plans in order to underpin a
recovery. Then, at a second stage many countries are expected to implement
signicant scal consolidation packages, once the economy has started to
recover and the current scal stimulus policies have been phased out. As
a response to the renewed interest in the role of scal policy, the literature
12Similar conclusions are reached by Giannoni (2000); Black, Macklem and Rose (1997);
Vestin (2006).
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has investigated the role of scal policy in the presence of nancial frictions
(Röger and int Veld (2009), Erceg and Lindè (2009), Villaverde (2010)).
Moreover, it is sometimes feared that, when nominal interest rates reach
the lower bound, monetary policy will become impotent in stimulating de-
mand. In these circumstances, scal policy may o¤er a necessary tool when
the nominal interest rate hits its ZLB. A recent strand of the literature (Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009); Erceg and Lindé (2009); Woodford
(2010)) has found that especially large scal multipliers are plausible when
monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB on nominal interest rate. The
underlying mechanism is that when the ZLB binds, the scal intervention
has much more stimulative e¤ects on the economy. This stimulative e¤ect
stems from the fact that when the economy is hit by a deationary shock,
the higher real interest rate increases desired savings and decreases desired
investments. If the nominal interest rate is lower bounded, the fall in output
must be larger to equate savings and investments. This larger fall in output
is undone by an increase in government purchases and hence government
spending multipliers are larger when the zero lower bound binds.
One practical objection to using scal policy when the ZLB binds is that
there are long lags in implementing an increase in government spending.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2009) study the size of government
spending multipliers in the presence of implementation lags. They nd that
the key determinant of the size of the multiplier is the state of the world in
which new government spending comes on line. If it comes on line in future
periods when the nominal interest rate is zero, there is a large e¤ect on out-
put. If it comes on line in future periods where the nominal interest rate is
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positive, the current e¤ect of government spending is smaller. On the other
hand, Erceg and Lindé (2009) show that if scal expansion is plagued by im-
plementation lags and eventually needs to be nanced by distortionary taxes,
then scal expansion can have contractionary e¤ects on economic activity
that are magnied if the ZLB on nominal rates is binding. Indeed, "timing"
seems to become a crucial aspect to take into account in implementing scal
policy when the nominal interest rate is close to the ZLB. Corsetti, Meier
and Müller (2009) and Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Müller (2010) argue that
the prospect of future spending cuts enhance the short-run stimulus e¤ect,
because it reduces ination expectations and hence reduces the long-term
interest rate. This argument holds also when the nominal short-term inter-
est rate is bounded. Nevertheless, if monetary policy is constrained by the
ZLB, the timing of the spending reversals is crucial. Reverting expenditure
too early while the ZLB is still binding and the economy is facing the
risk of deation might further delay the exit from the ZLB. Postponing
the reversal, instead, would reduce the stimulative short-term e¤ects of scal
policy.
In the previous section, I have investigated whether a PLT monetary
policy rule might help to avoid the ZLB. Instead, in this section, I explore
whether scal policy is a good tool when the ZLB is hit. For this purpose,
I examine the e¤ect of scal stimulus if the economy is characterized by
frictions in nancial markets and falls into a liquidity trap. Indeed, by the
second half of 2008, many economies experienced a severe nancial crisis and
nominal interest rates in the U.S. and other major world economies reached
historically low levels and in some cases have gone down close to zero.
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Following Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Müller (2010), I do not distin-
guish between Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents and I assume an exoge-
nous path for government expenditure. Fiscal stimulus is modelled as a 1%
government spending shock that follows an AR(1) process with a high degree
of persistence (G = 0:9):
Figure 5 displays the response of total output and its components (namely,
consumption and investment) to a risk premium shock in order to assess the
e¤ect of the scal stimulus. I also consider a specication of the model that
does not involve the nancial accelerator (hereafter, FA). The series marked
by spheres describes the reaction in a model a¤ected only by the risk pre-
mium shock, while the series marked by triangles describes a model which
allows also for the scal stimulus. Here, the scal stimulus is introduced as a
temporary measure, implemented only at the rst period. I distinguish three
alternative specications of the model: the baseline model with FA (Figure
5a), the model without FA (Figure 5b) and the model with FA and the ZLB
(Figure 5c). If the monetary policy is not constrained by the ZLB, the gov-
ernment spending shock is leading to a crowding-out of private investment.
Table 1 (rows 2-4) displays the value of the government spending mul-
tiplier in the three alternative specications. Again, the scal stimulus is
implemented at the initial time. If the ZLB is not binding, the net impact
on output is positive but the value of the scal multiplier13 is below one.
The simulations show that the nancial accelerator mechanism weakens the
e¤ects of the scal stimulus, as displayed in the second row. The reason is
that, in the presence of frictions in nancial markets, the initial decline of
13The short-term e¤ect of scal stimulus is calculated over a one-year horizon.
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the price of capital and the capital stock is translated into a higher lever-
age ratio, higher costs of new investment and hence lower economic activity.
In this way, the nancial accelerator mechanism dampens the expansionary
e¤ect of government spending, leading to a lower multiplier.
The ZLB increases the multiplier substantially. As displayed in the fourth
row, the government spending multiplier is slightly larger than one. The
reason for this result is that, with nominal interest rates held constant, the
higher ination generated by an expansionary scal policy will lead to a
decrease in real interest rates and this indirect monetary channel amplies
the GDP impact of the scal stimulus. This result is in line with the literature
reported above.
An opposite conclusion is reached in Cogan et al. (2009). Using an
empirical New Keynesian model calibrated for the US economy, they predict
small multiplier e¤ects of increased government purchases during a situation
in which the ZLB is binding. The crucial di¤erence is that they assume an
increase in government spending that lasts as long as the ZLB is binding.
Indeed, the duration of the scal stimulus turns out to be a crucial as-
pect to take into account in implementing scal policy, especially when the
nominal interest rate is close to the ZLB. There exists a general agreement
across models on the weak e¤ects of a prolonged scal stimulus. Coenen et
al. (2010) summarizes and compares the keys results of a broad class of mod-
els.14 They nd that, if scal expansion is not perceived to be temporary, it
14Specically, the seven models considered are: the QUEST model (European Com-
mission), the GIMF model (IMF), FRB-US and SIGMA (the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, BoC-GEM (Bank of Canada), the NAWM model (European
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results in long-run crowding out of private spending.
Table 1 (row 5) displays the scal multiplier in case of a prolonged scal
stimulus. In this case, the scal stimulus is still modelled as a 1% highly
persistent shock to the government expenditure, but now it is implemented
for 4 periods (namely, as long as the nominal interest rate is at the ZLB). In
this case, the multiplier e¤ect is still positive and higher than those arising
in a situation in which the ZLB is not binding. Nevertheless, the prolonged
scal stimulus is less e¤ective than a temporary one.
Fiscal stimulus becomes even counter-productive, if it is expected to con-
tinue beyond the point at which the ZLB ceases to bind. Table 1 (row 6)
suggests that if the scal stimulus is lasting 5 periods, it has contractionary
e¤ects on output, as shown by the negative value of the multiplier.
It has often been argued that one of the disadvantages of discretionary
scal policy is that it is not timely, due to implementation lags. In the
last row, Table 1 assesses the size of the government spending multiplier in
the presence of implementation lags. If government spending still comes on
line in future periods when the nominal interest rate is zero, but is delayed,
the e¤ects on output remain quite large, even though weaker than those
generated by a timelyscal intervention.
7 Conclusions and further extensions
In this paper, I have analyzed the implications of the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates in a DSGE model with nancial frictions. Three main
Central Bank), and the OECD Fiscal model.
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ndings are worth to be highlighted. First, the recession is magnied in the
presence of both nancial frictions and a binding constraint on nominal in-
terest rates. Second, when the central bank adopts a price-level targeting
rule (instead of an ination targeting rule), the probability to hit the lower
bound is reduced. When agents are forward-looking and the monetary au-
thority credibly commits to a price-level targeting rule, such a rule yields
lower variability of ination and of nominal interest rates. Agents expect
that the monetary authority will correct the deviation from the target, aim-
ing at an above-average ination rate. The private sectors expectations of
future ination after a deationary shock dampen the initial disination and
hence stabilize interest rates. Third, an increase in government spending
cushions the output fall but leads to a crowding-out of private consumption.
Therefore, the net impact of a scal stimulus on output is still positive, but
the value of the scal multiplier is below one. However, when the ZLB con-
straint is binding, the expansionary e¤ects of the government spending shock
are magnied and scal multipliers are larger than one. This result is in line
with the most recent literature on scal stimulus.
Concerning the e¤ectiveness of the scal stimulus when the nominal inter-
est rate is close to the ZLB, two further results are worth to be highlighted.
First, the duration of scal stimulus turns out to be a crucial aspect to take
into account in implementing scal policy. If the scal stimulus continues
beyond the period at which the zero lower bound ceases to bind, then it
has contractionary e¤ects on output. Second, the presence of lags in imple-
menting discretionary scal policy might weaken the expansionary e¤ects on
output. Nevertheless, if government spending is delayed but still comes on
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line in future periods when the nominal interest rate is zero, the stimulative
e¤ect on output remains quite large.
This analysis opens the door to further extensions and future work. First,
the robustness of the results should be checked with respect to some model
parameters. Specically, the implications of higher nominal rigidity and of a
more elastic labour supply could be explored. Moreover, the implications of
setting alternative monetary rules are worth examining.15 Finally, a further
step might be to distinguish the e¤ects of several types of scal instruments,
such as government spending, transfers, labour tax cuts, consumption tax
cuts, etc...
15For instance, Williams (2009) explores the implications of setting a Taylor rule that
responds very aggressively to movements in the output gap. He nds that outcomes for
output gap and ination rate variability close to those of the unconstrained classic Taylor
rule, at the cost of somewhat greater interest rate variability. Interestingly, too strong a
response to the output gap can be counterproductive, due to the asymmetry of the policy
response resulting from the ZLB. When the output gap is positive, policy tightens sharply.
But when the output gap is negative, the policy response may be truncated by the ZLB.
This asymmetric response causes output gap variability to rise at very low ination rate
targets during the recession.
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A The steady-state equilibrium
At the steady-state:
A = 1
Q = 1
 = 1
Rn =
1

R = Rn
N =
1
lev
QK
MC =
#P   1
#P
P
F =

QK
N
!
R
premium =
F
R
rK = [F   (1  )]Q
I = K
Y = C + I
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B The linearized model
The log-linearized model is described as it follows:
Consumers:
C^t = C^t+1   1

[R^nt   ^t+1 + Z^t)]
^t =  C^t
W^t =  H^t   ^t
^t+1 = R^
n
t   R^t
then, ^t+1 = ^t   R^t   Z^t
Firms:
Y^t = A^t + K^t + (1  )H^t
r^kt = Y^t + M^Ct   K^t
Kt = I^t + (1  )K^t 1
Q^t = (I^t   K^t)
Entrepreneurs:
F^t + Q^t 1 =
rk
F
r^kt +
(1  )
F
Q^t
F^t+1 =  !N^t + !K^t + (R^t + Z^t) + !Q^t + !X^t
N^t+1
F
=
K
N
F^t (K
N
 1)(R^t+Z^t) !(K
N
 1)(K^t+Q^t+X^t)+[!(K
N
 1)+1]N^t
p^remiumt = EtF^t+1   R^t   Z^t
Price setting:
^t = ^t+1 +
(1  ')(1  ')
'
(M^Ct   Pt)
Equilibrium
Y^t =
C
Y
C^t +
I
Y
I^t +
G
Y
G^t
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Monetary Policy rule:
R^nt = (^t   ) + RR^nt 1
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Figure 1: Risk premium shock
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Figure 1 bis: Risk premium shock
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Figure 2: Financial shock
47
0 5 10 15 20
-0.012
-0.01
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
Real interest rate
Baseline model Model with ZLB constraint
0 5 10 15 20
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
Inflation
0 5 10 15 20
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Net worth
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
Premium
Figure 2 bis: Financial shock
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Figure 3: Risk premium shock
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Figure 3 bis: Risk premium shock
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Figure 4: Financial shock
51
0 5 10 15 20
-0.012
-0.01
-0.008
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0
Real interest rate
Model with real FA and IT rule Model with real FA and PLT rule
0 5 10 15 20
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
x  10-3 Inflation
0 5 10 15 20
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
Net worth
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Premium
Figure 4 bis: Financial shock
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Figure 5a: Fiscal stimulus in the baseline model with FA
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Figure 5b: Fiscal stimulus in the model without FA
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Figure 5c: Fiscal stimulus in the model with FA and the ZLB
55
Model specication Fiscal stimulus
Y
G
Model with FA temporary 0.502
Model without FA temporary 0.336
Model with FA+ZLB temporary 1.015
Model with FA+ZLB prolonged as long as the ZLB binds 0.945
Model with FA+ZLB prolonged beyond the ZLB binds -0.474
Model with FA+ZLB delayed 0.922
Table 1: Government spending multipliers
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